The Army Tactical Missile (ATACMS)

ATACMS is a short-range ballistic missile (300 kms) that can be fired from the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) or the M270 Multiple Launcher Rocket System (MLRS). In the case of HIMARS, each vehicle can fire one ATACMS and the M270 can fire 2 ATACMS. The missile is substantially larger than traditionally used munitions. There are several variants of this system:

·         M39 and M39A1 both with cluster munitions and which differ essentially in guidance, the M39A1 being guided by GPS and having a longer range (300kms) than the M39 (165kms);

·         M48, GPS-guided but unitary warhead. The warhead being the WAU23-B of the 230kgs Harpoon missile;

·         M57, GPS-guided and with the same warhead as the M48 but with software and hardware changes;

·         M57E1, which was created to upgrade the M39 and M39A1 to unitary warhead and with guidance systems and software at the level of the M57;

It is essential to explain the different options that this system allows and the variants it has. The US has about 2500 missiles in stock, and for ease of reference, about one-third are M39 and M39A1 and two-thirds M57 and M57E1. The number of M48 is minimal, around 120. It is also important to mention that there is still production capacity, especially for sales to foreign countries (Poland, Romania, Turkey, etc.) but the US is currently looking to replace the ATACMS with the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) that has longer ranges and is smaller. The PrSM is already in production, but series production is still being tested, so it is not yet in "active service" and assigned to the units.

But what is the relevance of ATACMS to the Ukrainian war effort, when they already have the Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missiles with similar ranges?

Well, first of all, the more systems that allow deep strikes on high value targets, the better. Then, ATACMS being a ballistic system is more easily detected, but on the other hand it allows Operational commanders to shorten the targeting process.

That is, if a Ukrainian unit detects in depth a high value target, even if it’s mobile (e.g. S400), the operational commander does not need to request from Kyiv a cruise missile attack that has to be carried out by a Ukrainian Air Force aircraft and that may, in the strategic context, not be a priority. Simply order one of the artillery brigades to use one or more ATACMS to destroy the target. It greatly shortens the targeting process and makes the "find", to "fix" and to "finish" (F3) much more streamlined.

At the strategic level, it allows you to plan multi-vector and multi-directional attacks on highly defended and high-value targets. Coordinating drones, cruise missiles and ATACMS. Sevastopol and some of the air bases in Crimea or even Berdyansk could be attacked with significant damage and heavy casualties inflicted on Air Defense, Electronic Warfare and Aviation systems.

But what is certain is that it has not yet been provided by the US. The Biden Administration has some internal tensions over this issue, even after the U.K. and France provided the cruise missiles. The Department of Defense (DoD) is the main source of resistance to this supply, and its senior analysts, in their best tradition, have convinced the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to oppose the supply. Even when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the National Security Council (NSC) are in favor of it.

The arguments presented are apparently 3 that need to be dismantled.

The first is the fear of escalation. If Ukraine uses ATACMS against targets in Russia we may face a circumstance of direct involvement and a conflict between the US/NATO and the Russian Federation. Clearly, Ukraine has been scrupulous in not using SCALPs against targets in Russia and there is nothing to suggest that it would not be so with ATACMS.

The second is stocks. The U.S. would be compromising the readiness and ability to fight a conflict in another theater because it has no substitute. An argument probably reinforced by the Indo Pacific Combatant Command (INDOPACOM) because they will have much of the stock for a contingency with North Korea.  As I said there are 2500 in stock and no one, with a minimum of common sense dares to suggest supplying even 1000 to Ukraine. A few hundred and the impact is huge, if used well. The argument doesn't stick.

Finally, many could not work because they have been in stock for a long time and may have problems. This argument makes no sense because, there may be some that do not work properly, it will not be relevant.

The political issue is that neither the NSC nor the President wants to be seen undermining and bypassing SECDEF, which would lead to the DoD bureaucracy reacting and creating problems with their contacts in the media and Congress. This issue, if Lloyd Austin does not change his mind, will have to be arbitrated by President Biden. But it was preferable that in a election cycle one more problem was avoided, so it all comes down to a policy choice with costs, or not, of President Biden.